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ANALYSING CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA
LAWRENCE SCHLEMMER
The definition of what constitutes meaningful change in South 
Africa is a vexed question.
There is virtually no consensus in the public debate on change 
and reform. At the same point in time for example, one finds on the 
one hand prominent Afrikaans writer Andre Brink claiming that change and 
reform are a "big white lie" (Sunday Times, 24.4.83), reflecting no more 
than the increasing sophistication of repression in the system, and on 
the other a number of notable international observers of South Africa 
conceding that at least the preconditions for change exist [The Center 
Magazine3- March/April, 1983).
A recent issue of Newsweek (21.3.83) carried a special report 
by Joseph Treen and Holger Jensen entitled "Apartheid's Harsh New Grip: 
Botha's 'reforms' help a few Blacks but the Majority finds life worse 
than ever". The article created a temporary furore in South Africa, 
with Foreign Minister Pik Botha slamming the negative diagnosis and 
making vehement counterclaims about change in South Africa, and about 
inaccuracies in the report.
The Newsweek article illustrates the difficulty of making 
assessments about change and reform. Very briefly summarised, the 
article conceded that some change had occurred in the following spheres: 
labour legislation 
desegregation of facilities, and
constitutional policy, affecting coloured and Indian people only.
Against this it argued that retrogression had occurred in regard 
to:
forced resettlement of blacks; 
prosecutions in terms of influx control laws; 
the supply of black housing;
poverty, disease and under-nourishment in the homelands; and 
unemployment in the homelands.
It also placed emphasis on the gap in educational expenditure for black
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and white children and on differential taxation laws which penalised 
blacks with families.
The ratio for the gap in per capita educational expenditure 
given in the article, 11 to 1, is inaccurate. The ratio in the 1980/81 
financial year was 6,5 to 1, representing a very significant decrease 
from over 18 to 1 in 1970/71. Also, since the article was written, 
new taxation laws for blacks have been introduced in parliament so 
that blacks and whites are now to be taxed on the same basis. The 
analysis also overlooked the recent legislation providing for fully- 
fledged black local government in the townships of the common area.
In the other respects, however, the article is not incorrect 
in broad terms. If one overlooks the emotive language, innuendo, and 
the suggestion of trends for the worse where conditions are simply 
statically bad, it corresponds fairly closely to many of the facts 
relative to change cited in the previous (sample) issue of INDICATOR 
("Balance Sheet of Change in South Africa Today", January 1983).
However, while a mixed assessment was given in INDICATOR, NEWSWEEK 
drew a negative conclusion.
THE NEED FOR A BALANCED METHOD
The problem with the article and with the reactions to it 
from the side of the South African government lie not so much in facts 
but in interpretations. Interpretation rests on assumptions - usually 
based on a broader theory or philosophy - and on criteria of assessment. 
South Africa, like any society, is a complex reality, and at any 
given time manifests scores of contradictory facts and trends.
Therefore, depending on assumptions made and criteria adopted, virtually 
any conclusion is possible. Most, but not all progressives or radicals 
claim that little or no significant change is occurring, and most 
conservatives argue that it is. Both support their conclusions with 
usually correct facts.
For this reason, it is necessary injthe POLITICAL MONITOR 
to attempt to reach a consistent and comprehensive
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method of assessing change, in which important assumptions are stated 
and criteria are specified. This essay sets out a method, and 
subsequent analyses will be made within a consistent framework. In 
this way an attempt will be made to overcome some of the difficulty of 
balanced interpretation. Obviously any analysis has its own biases, 
but hopefully the method proposed below will at least limit partiality 
to some extent.
SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY: A SIMPLE MODEL
The social and political patterns in South Africa are not 
simply the outcome of shapeless, pervasive discrimination, nor of 
straightforward differences in level of socio-economic or cultural 
development between the different races. There is a firm and well- 
established structure to the system, and the prospects for change 
must be established in terras of this structure.
South Africa is a divided society, but the divisions are not 
simply those of race or ethnicity. Rather, the divisions in the 
established order are best understood in terms of four principles:
1. The first principle defines the identity of the political power 
establishment. This principle is racial/cultural in nature at 
the present time since white Afrikaans Nationalists, in combination 
with certain conservative, non-Afrikaans whites, are the established 
ruling group. This we will simply call the overt POLITICAL POWER 
division.
There is, of course, also hidden or latent political power exercised 
by lobbies and pressure groups outside the political establishment. 
Political pressures also come from covert and informal political 
movements or from underground movements such as the ANC. These 
forces act on and through the overt political establishment, however.
2. The second principle arises from the society's status as
a fairly advanced industrial economy. Position in the occupational 
structure of the economy and the modern bureaucracy introduces 
important divisions. While the variations in occupational
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status result in myriad minor status-divisions in society, a 
major line of division occurs between those positions identified 
with economic, organisational or bureaucratic power and those 
which are perceived or perceive themselves to be in opposition 
to or subordinate to such power. This, then, would be the well- 
known principle of CLASS.
Here one must actually distinguish between two lines of division. 
One refers to the CONTROLLING CLASS, and the second to that 
section of the population which, despite lack of power, 
tends to identify with the controlling class rather than the 
working class. We will term it the MIDDLE CLASS. The remaining 
members of the population are usually referred to as the working 
class.
3. The third principle defines which groups are accorded full 
membership of the South African 'nation' —  it is the principle 
of CITIZENSHIP.
4. The fourth principle defines the groups which are included within 
the reach of the developed core of services and amenities in the 
Southern African region and those which are relegated to the 
less-developed periphery. This can be called the principle of 
marginality, but it will simply be termed INCLUSION-EXCLUSION.
These dividing principles are superimposed on one another in 
the complex pattern of South African society. Some lines of division 
reinforce each other where they coincide. Where they do not coincide 
they can weaken each other's effects.
One may depict the principles of division diagrammatically, 
as in Figure I, with the obvious qualification that no diagram can 
possibly reflect all the complexities of the structure.
Obviously the different principles of division influence one 
another; for example members of the controlling class are likely to
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have more political influence than others, etc. One type of division 
may also be in part a consequence of another. It is frequently argued 
that race divisions are deepened by competing economic interests.
The diagram is therefore of necessity oversimple. It cannot reflect
all the complexities and processes in the system. It serves simply as
a basic illustrative model for analysis of change.
ASSESSING CHANGE
What is important about the diagram is that each line of 
division represents a BLOCK or impediment to processes of change in 
the system. Each division is in a sense a line of defence for all 
sorts of vested interests.
By implication, then, each division of interests creates the 
possibility of opposition. Where opposition is effectively mobilised, 
the line of defence is placed under pressure. Hence, for example, 
class interests are placed under pressure by the independent trade 
union movement.
Change cannot be seen as a simple incremental process.
Shifts in patterns within lines of division are far easier than change 
which impinges on the lines of division or in which groups or 
individuals try to cross them. Reform within African education will 
occur more readily than reforms involving an integration of services.
Each of the principles or lines of division, therefore, also 
represents a criterion of whether or not structural change is occurring. 
If the position of a black group shifts across a line of division, its 
access to power, privilege or social advantages is meaningfully 
increased.
CHANGE: A PHASED PROCESS
There is much talk about ,:cosmetic" change in South Africa; 
change which affects only a small minority or which increases an
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irrelevant or unimportant privilege. One also hears a great deal 
about counter-productive reform - reform which simply decreases 
tension in society, providing safety valves or outlets for frustration, 
hence increasing stability and strengthening the status quo ante.
Both cosmetic change and counter-productive reform certainly 
exist. However, there is also a tendency among some observers to 
include too many developments in these categories. Some apparently 
cosmetic changes, and some ameliorative reforms, can create pre­
conditions, pressures or needs for further change. If this in fact 
occurs then apparently mild shifts could have meaningful consequences 
over time.
Examples of this could be seen in the easing of restrictions on 
African businessmen in townships in "white" areas and in the granting of 
99-year property leasehold for urban Africans. The implications of both 
were that urban Africans shifted closer to becoming recognised and 
accepted as permanent members of the common society. This recognition, 
in turn, will create contradictions in policy. Contradictions create 
credibility problems, which put pressures on the government to resolve 
the .inconsistencies. How can a permanent population group be deprived 
of full citizenship in perpetuity?
In this way any change or reform, no matter how small, must 
be carefully assessed in terms of its capacity to create pressures 
for further reform. Equally, however, each one must be considered 
for its ability to defuse pressure and reinforce an existing state of 
affairs.
WHAT IS THE MOST BASIC ISSUE?
One must, however, be mindful of the fact that certain changes 
or reforms can affect major structures in our society, while others may 
be relevant to less-basic issues. There is very little consensus on 
the question of what the most basic organising principle or principle 
of division is.
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One school, usually termed "revisionist" will insist that the 
basic issue, is material interests, taking the form especially of an 
interest in the control and effective exploitation of the black labour 
force. This school sees an underlying association between political 
policies, including separate development, and the economic interests 
of capitalists. This school would argue that certain tacit and 
longer-run understandings and shared priorities exist between white 
capitalists and white political leaders, despite any short run dis­
agreements over specific policies at any given time.
Another "school" with a much less consistent or more flexible 
analysis, to a large extent separates the economic and political 
dimensions. It would see economic and political forces as determining 
societal patterns interactively, but often in conflict with one another. 
Ethnic policies, like separate development, are seen as having a dynamic 
of their own, derived from group power interests, in contrast to the 
specific interests of capital.
Both "schools" would agree, however, that the exclusion or 
marginalisation of African people as embodied in the homeland policy 
is one very important basic feature of our system (see line of 
inclusion-exclusion in the diagram).
This article concludes with a brief assessment of possibilities 
of change in this major division in South Africa. More detailed 
assessments of this issue will appear in subsequent reports as well as 
examinations of change in the other principles outlined in the diagram.
INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF HOMELAND REGIONS: FEDERALISM OR
CONFEDERALISM---- --- 1,--- - ----------------------------------------
The function of separate development and the confederation policy
The policy of separate development aims at the creation of 
sovereign mini-states in which the vast bulk of Africans, divided into 
ethnic groups, are supposed to pursue their political destiny. However
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idealistically government spokesmen defend this policy, it is widely 
recognised that its effect will be that the mini-state homelands and 
their populations of subsistence farmers, migrant workers and their 
dependents will be formally and systematically excluded from South 
African nationhood, and from access to the developed services, amenities, 
industrial infrastructure and economic opportunities of the common 
society. As such it is seen to represent the ultimate degree of 
rightlessness in South Africa.
It is generally accepted, however, that these territories 
and the industrial core are completely interdependent in economic 
terms. In order to accommodate this interdependence the government 
proposes a "confederation" of independent but economically interacting 
states. The overarching confederal body will be consultative and 
advisory; it will not impinge on the autonomy of the white-ruled 
Republic. The confederation, if successfully launched, will no doubt 
assist the government in countering demands by homeland-based Africans 
for participation in common-area politics and their claims to South 
African citizenship.
For these reasons certain non-independent homelands and 
particularly the biggest of these,. KwaZulu, are resisting independence 
and the idea of a confederation. Chief Buthelezi, Chief Minister of 
KwaZulu and president of the very large black political organisation, 
Inkatha, repeatedly and emphatically states his followers' claims 
to full South African citizenship. Hence there is very strongly 
mobilised opposition to both the denial of South African citizenship 
and to geographic-political exclusion.
Initiatives towards a possible federal alternative
Accompanying this opposition are various initiatives in support 
of a "federal" alternative to separate development. In 1980 the Quail 
Commission, appointed by the then non-independent government of the 
Ciskei, proposed in te r  a lia a "condominium" of Ciskei and the Eastern
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Cape - a form of shared regional government but within the Republic 
of South Africa. (The Ciskei, however, chose independence after a 
controversial referendum.) In 1981, the Bureau of Economic and Political 
Analysis of the University of Pretoria, commissioned by the Natal Sugar 
Association in response to homeland consolidation investigations by the 
government, concluded that separate development for Natal-KwaZulu 
was unworkable. It recommended a linked government and administration 
for rural Natal and KwaZulu with political integration in metropolitan 
areas, all within the Republic. The Buthelezi Commission, established 
by the KwaZulu government, after an exhaustive enquiry and research, 
proposed as part of its political recommendations, a process of 
regional unification for Natal and KwaZulu with safeguards for 
minorities, with representation in, and full citizenship of, the Republic 
as a whole.
The South African Cabinet rejected all three proposals although 
certain members of the government privately have given cautious and 
qualified support to possibilities of closer association between homeland 
regions and the South African state. The KwaZulu government is currently 
drafting a white paper on the political-constitutional aspects of the 
Buthelezi Commission and will no doubt be presenting formal political 
proposals to the South African government in due course.
All these initiatives imply broadly a federal relationship 
between the central government and the homeland regions. In a federal 
system, the homelands would remain part of South Africa, and their political 
representatives would participate in central decision-making on issues 
of common concern for all regions in South Africa.
More recently, Dr. Cedric Phatudi, the Chief Minister of Lebowa 
has spoken in favour of federation as opposed to confederation. The 
President of Transkei has approached KwaZulu and Inkatha, and the 
possibilities of a unified approach on the federal possibility have 
been discussed. (Transkei would, of course, have to modify its status 
of sovereign -independence in such a future dispensation.) The Transkei 
claims to be motivated by the failure of separate development to adequately
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serve the development needs of the territory and its people.
These initiatives are proceeding, and further meetings are 
planned soon, possibly involving a wider range of homeland leaders.
The Prime Minister, however, has attempted to minimise the significance 
of these developments by attempting to distance the "white" Republic 
from them, stating that the homelands were welcome to form a federation 
on their own. How viable, then., are these initiatives?
Prospects for changes in policy
The formal stance of the .white government is that South Africa 
is not a single state but a system composed of multiple nationalities, 
each of which must have its own autonomous territorial base. The totally 
interdependent economy, however, has consistently contradicted the multi­
national principle. The government is attempting to resolve this in 
its most recent regional development policy, by making provision for an 
elaborate consultation process based on advisory committees on issues 
of economic development in each of the eight development regions.
The soon to be established development bank is also to have a multi­
national board, and it seems that the non-independent homelands will 
have representation as part of the South African contingent.
There is, however, no provision for any joint decision­
making in the initial allocation of homeland development capital in the 
South African budget. This will gainsay any claims that the populations 
of the national states have an equitable share of the fiscal revenue 
which they, through migrant labour, help to generate.
The basic weakness in the credibility of the policy will exert 
a constant moral pressure for joint overall planning and budgeting, 
and hence also a pressure for something more like a federal than a confederal 
relationship between regions.
Another major pressure acting against confederation is the massive 
and increasing concentration of "commuters" around common-area industrial 
areas like Durban-Pinetown, East London, Richards Bay and others which
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will create increasing needs for metropolitan planning and servicing 
across the borders of "national states".
An issue of considerable significance as well is the huge cost 
and impracticality of consolidating certain homelands into cohesive 
geographic entities. There is considerable opposition to consolidation 
from white business and farming interests in Natal, for example. Even 
if consolidated, KwaZulu would probably comprise ten separate pieces of 
territory; hardly an adequate territorial basis for sovereign independence. 
Independent homelands as potential security threats must also be of some 
concern to the government. A further major factor is that the independent 
black unions, which implicitly or explicitly must increase their political 
influence; are non "multi-national" in organisation, as will be the 
envisaged urban African local authorities (early attempts by the 
government to introduce ethnic criteria in each have been abandoned). 
"Cosmopolitan" black local government under a minister in the central 
South African cabinet is hardly compatible with the notion that all 
Africans should be citizens of totally independent homelands, in which 
even urban Africans would be expected to exercise a vote.
To this one must add that even sympathetic overseas governments 
reject the homeland policy and are insistent on a common citizenship.
This view is shared by influential industrialists. Finally, the 
official opposition is implacably opposed to a divided citizenship.
For these reasons one can anticipate that government policy 
thinking will be put under pressure to move back to a position tentatively 
enunciated in 1981, in which a softening of homeland boundaries was 
envisaged; co-operation across "soft" political boundaries was the 
phrase used.
.A major consideration in this regard is how a "federal" dis­
pensation would affect the vested interests which have developed within 
the homeland administrations and among the political and business elites 
in these territories. Very broadly assessed the type of alternative in 
question might suit them fairly well in some respects. Since a federal
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arrangement would involve the type of regional devolution of powers that 
non-independent homelands presently have, it would protect existing 
power bases and political constituencies. It would presumably also 
suit some of the existing interests of homeland businessmen and 
bureaucrats. The real impact of this type of constitutional arrangement 
would lie in two areas. Firstly, the greater "legitimacy" of homeland 
politics might mean that there would be more enthusiastic voter partici­
pation and hence more pressure on homeland politicians to address basic 
needs. Secondly it would influence national development policies and 
aid including industrial decentralisation strategies* and probably also 
improve the access to employment of homeland-based peri-urban commuters 
and rural migrant workers.
Given the pressures on the government and the impracticalities of 
the present homelands policy, and taking into account the "federal" 
initiatives already in progress, some modification of the current 
government policies in this direction could very well eventuate in due 
course.
The question of significance
What kind of change would this be? Many people would see it 
as ameliorative and cosmetic, if not as dangerous because it might 
continue to divide the African political constituency. It would also 
strengthen African political leaders who are perceived by progressive 
groupings as being too moderate or "collaborative". In this regard 
a lot would depend on the responses of the homeland electorates.
Given the probability that more far-reaching political changes 
affecting Africans are not likely in the short to medium term, and given 
the level of need in the homelands, a more positive interpretation can 
be placed on these possibilities. If the kind of possible system being 
debated involves a development towards effective representation in 
central decision-making and a common South African citizenship, it will 
counter what is often termed the "marginalisation" of homeland-based Africans. 
As one way of establishing or re-establishing the rights of Africans in 
South Africa it would amount to a fairly meaningful process of "structural" 
reform.
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